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Introduction: the new urban challenge
1 In a historical review of Belgian electoral geography Vandermotten e.a. (2001) observe
that the new parties Agalev and Vlaams Blok, since their establishment at the end of
the 1970s, have shown themselves increasingly as «urban» parties, to the detriment of
the  classical  urban  fractions  of  liberals  and  socialists.  However,  Kesteloot  and  De
Maesschalck (2001) describe a discrepancy between the decidedly urban electorate of
the Vlaams Blok and the anti-urban ideology of the party. Their Marxist interpretation
of Louis Wirth’s seminal definition of the urban (size, density and diversity) defines the
city as a place where wealth is concentrated (size and density), wealth that can be used
to  liberate  certain  individuals  of  reproductive  tasks  to  spend  their  time  thinking,
innovating, creating. They consider heterogeneity of the population and a variety of
milieus as indispensable for the stimulating confrontation and exchange of ideas and
information  that  leads  to  progress.  The  Vlaams  Blok,  who  rejects  diversity  and
redistribution of wealth, undermines this innovating urban milieu. According to the
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authors, Agalev is the only party that could take up the challenge of becoming a truly
«urban» counterforce against this horse of Troy for the city. 
2 In this paper, we will  critically assess this statement through an evaluation of both
parties’ party manifestoes and spatial distribution of votes throughout their first two
decennia of existence, the 1980s and the 1990s. 
3 In  a  first  paragraph,  we  theoretically  assess  the  relationship  between  electoral
geographies, spatial electoral strategies and party manifestoes. Secondly, we draw a
more detailed electoral geography of both allegedly urban parties and analyse their
position in the metropolitan region. Thirdly, we relate this electoral geography to the
statements concerning the city both parties make in their manifestoes. In a concluding
paragraph, we will  assess their value as defenders of  «the urban» and evaluate the
potential for a further elaboration of a geographical approach to «manifesto research». 
 
Electoral geography and manifesto research
4 In his review of electoral geography between 1960 and 1987, Agnew (1990) asserted that
there exists only a small school of electoral geographers who have paid attention to
what he describes as «the relation between electoral geography and the geography of
party organisation and mobilisation». According to Flint (2003), this school has been
firmly established within electoral geography in recent years. Influential scholars have
worked on the relation between electoral geography and the local strength of party
organisation (Agnew, 1996; Shin, 2001) or the relation between electoral geography and
campaign spending (Forrest, 1992; 1997; Pattie and Johnston, 2003). 
5 However,  the  relationship  between  ideological  content  and  electoral  geography
remains underdeveloped. A few early studies (e.g. Johnston, 1979; Taylor and Johnston,
1979)  demonstrated  the  relationship  between  geographical  electoral  patterns  and
policy propositions: In systems with majority representation, it seems that governing
parties tend to pay extra attention to those districts where their majority has not been
firmly established in order to win votes. These studies have been criticised later on for
departing from a too simplistic and uncritical input-output logic by Taylor (1984) and
Taylor and Flint  (2000).  Taylor claims that policy measures (output)  are not simply
designed to satisfy the electorate (politics of support), but aim even more to enhance
capital  accumulation  by  those  capitalists  who  control  the  governmental  apparatus
(politics  of  power).  Hence  the  input  (i.e.  votes)  and  the  output  (i.e.  policy)  can  be
contradictory, and input-output models do not account for that. While Taylor’s «two
politics»  schema  has  put  forward  an  important  dilemma  to  take  into  account,  it
nonetheless proved difficult  to apply in concrete research as it  remains based on a
highly abstract and simplified theory of the state (Reynolds, 1990). 
6 One way to avoid the dilemma is  to explicitly focus on one out of  both politics.  In
political science, the study of politics of support has been promoted by the by now well-
established tradition of manifesto research. Party manifestoes are the most literal and
elaborated expression of party ideology accessible to the electorate (although voters
will of course seldom read the whole manifesto) and explicitly serve electoral aims. Of
course we must stay aware of the fact that what has been written in the manifesto will
not necessarily coincide with policy measures taken afterwards. This however does not
meet  the  argument  that  the  politics  of  power  will  distort  the  electoral  strategy  of
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manifesto  writing only  to  a  limited extent  and that  an analysis  of  the relationship
between voting patterns and manifesto content can be insightful for the analysis of the
politics of support. This holds true even more for parties like Agalev and the Vlaams
Blok who, for the period under scrutiny, have not been in power since their inception
and hence have so far been able to focus on politics of support only.
7 The tradition of  manifesto research (which has not  yet  received much attention in
geographical circles) has been pioneered by Downs (1957). In his seminal analysis on
the influence of electoral competition on party statements, he positioned parties on a
left  to  right  scale  on  the  basis  of  their  manifesto  and  analysed  shifts  over  time.
Following Downs,  a  school  of  «manifesto research» gradually  developed,  led by the
internationally  comparative  Manifesto  Research  Group  of  David  Robertson  and  Ian
Budge (see Volkens, 2001 or Budge & Bara, 2001 for a review of manifesto research).
Downs’  (1957)  main  conclusion  was  that  in  systems  with  majority  representation,
parties would inevitably soften their position, and converge to the centre. 
8 Alternative  hypotheses  have  tried  to  refine  Down’s  original  statement  and
strengthened the relationship with electoral results. Analysing party statements under
different electoral circumstances, Robertson (1975) added a more dynamic approach to
the original hypothesis. He assumed that parties would soften their position above all
when they would not be sure of their majority and needed extra votes. When more
convinced of winning the elections, they would shift more to the extremes in order to
satisfy traditionally convicted voters. In time, this hypothesis has been further refined
and  contradicted.  One  counter-hypothesis  (which  seems  to  be  more  valuable  in
proportional systems) states that parties will always want to win more votes, and will
always shift towards the centre. 
9 The most refined hypothesis so far comes from Budge (1994), who supposes that parties
always depart from a situation of complete uncertainty, and that parties are therefore
relatively  immobile  on  a  left-to-right  scale.  Because  they  do  not  possess  adequate
information about the preferences of voters, they will only change their manifesto step
by  step,  in  order  not  to  lose  the  votes  gained  at  the  previous  elections.  Previous
elections proved to be the best indicators for shifting party positions. With a rising
number of votes, parties hold their ground; only when the number of votes is declining,
a party feels the urge for considerable manifesto changes. 
10 All these models consider the complete manifesto from the point of view of a left-right
scale. Robertson (1975) however, is also the inventor of the so-called «saliency theory».
This theory claims that parties will always stress in their manifesto specific issues of
which  they  can  claim  the  «historical  rights»,  and  with  which  they  had  success  in
previous elections. They will try to avoid competing issues that are claimed by other
parties.  They will  only try to reclaim other parties’  issues from a different point of
view, when those issues start dominating the elections.  For our spatial  analysis,  we
reinterpret  Robertson’s  saliency  theory  in  geographical  terms:  parties  not  only
«specialise» in certain issues, but equally claim the rights on certain geographical areas
in which they have a strong base. In contrast to Johnston’s (1979) analysis of majority
systems,  we  suppose  that  in  proportional  systems,  parties  will  not  so  much try  to
emphasize  districts  in  which  the  election  results  are  unclear  in  order  to  obtain  a
majority, but will try to stress certain issues in their manifesto that are related to a
certain socio-spatial  domain in which they are strong: socio-spatial  groups who are
potential  voters,  or  socio-spatial  problems  that  a  party  can  claim  and  from  which
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electoral  support  in  a  certain area  can be  drawn (see  also  Duncan and Epps,  1992;
Scheiner,  1999,  Agnew et  al.,  2002).  Following Budge (1994) parties will  only change
their ideological geography when their electoral geography is under threat. In other
words, Vlaams Blok and Agalev, as allegedly «urban» parties, will stress «urban» issues
in their manifesto. They will specialise on certain subjects, and will only rarely try to
steal each other's issues. As long as they remain strong and growing in urban areas,
they will not change their standpoints on this area and the issues connected to it.
 
Electoral geography of Vlaams Blok and Agalev in
Flanders (1977-1999)
11 Kesteloot  & De  Maesschalck  (2001)  demonstrated  how Vlaams Blok  and Agalev  are
markedly stronger in urban areas than in rural areas, and how this discerns both new
parties  from  the  classical  ones.  A  detailed  analysis  however  shows  the  subtle
differences between both parties’  electoral  geography within the metropolitan area
(figure 1).  The results of the municipal elections (in those municipalities where the
party in question did put in a list of candidates) have been classified according to the
position of the municipality in the metropolitan area, following the classification of
Van der Haegen et al. (1996)1. It might seem odd to analyse municipal election results
together with party manifestoes for parliamentary elections. This has been a pragmatic
decision, which allowed us the necessary degree of geographical refinement (municipal
results  of  parliamentary  elections  are  not  systematically  collected)  to  use  Van  der
Haegen et al.’s classification. Because of the bilingual Council in the Brussels Capital
Region, which complicates the analysis of electoral results, the figures are limited to
Flanders
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Figure 1. Evolution of the percentage of votes for Agalev and Vlaams Blok in the different parts of
the metropolitan area.
12 Figure 1 demonstrates the different spatiality of both parties. Agalev is strong in the
central city, the agglomeration and the banlieue, and much weaker in the commuter
zone and the rest group, mainly rural areas. The differences approximately remain the
same, even though Agalev has experienced more or less continuously growing support
in all zones. The Vlaams Blok is considerably stronger in the central city than in the
rest of the region, and the difference increases from election to election. In electoral
terms, Vlaams Blok is clearly a more urban party than Agalev, and increasingly so, even
though Vlaams Blok also gains more and more support in more peripheral areas. 
13 A second analysis, a cluster-analysis on the parliamentary elections between 1977-1999,
concentrates  on  the  electoral  cantons  in  the  metropolitan  area  of  the  two  biggest
Flemish  cities,  Antwerp  and  Ghent  (approximated  by  their  respective  provinces  of
Antwerp and East-Flanders).  They are analysed separately because the difference in
voting  outcomes  between  both  regions  is  considerable.  Both  parties  originated  in
Antwerp  and  this  city  is  still  their  electoral  stronghold,  with  markedly  higher
percentages  than  in  Ghent  (De  Maesschalck,  2000).  As  opposed  to  the  province  of
Antwerp, were Agalev was already present in 1977, the party made its appearance in
East-Flanders only in 1981.
14 In both provinces, we obtained similar results with clusters forming concentric zones
around the central city. The concentric zones around Antwerp (figure 2) more or less
coincide with the zones of the metropolitan region. We can interpret these by means of
the cluster profiles (figure 3), which show the deviation from the mean support for the
respective parties in the respective years. Cluster 5 is the central city where Vlaams
Blok, but also Agalev draw an important proportion of their votes. However, while the
central city remains the main stronghold for the Vlaams Blok throughout the years
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(only in slight decline by the end of the period), this is not true for Agalev. Cluster 3,
which  coincides  more  or  less  with  the  agglomeration  and  banlieue  of  the  city,  is
relatively  more  important  for  Agalev  and less  so  for  Vlaams Blok.  Throughout  the
years, this  zone slightly  increases  its  importance for  the  Vlaams Blok,  and slightly
decreases  for  Agalev.  Cluster  2  overlaps  to  a  large  extent  with  the  banlieue  and
commuter zone. Vlaams Blok does not draw much support here but this zone gains in
importance for Agalev, what seems to be related to proceeding suburbanisation. Cluster
1 is  a  more rural  area,  where both parties are relatively weak.  In the south of  the
province, the pattern is disturbed by the industrial region Boom-Puurs-Mechelen, waar
Vlaams Blok is relatively strong, but not Agalev. As said, we obtained a similar pattern
with the cluster-analysis for East-Flanders (figure 4), although the concentric pattern is
more disturbed by regional anomalies; the city of Ghent is considerably smaller than
Antwerp and its area of influence does not cover the whole of the province. Hence
cluster 3 does not only cover the Ghent inner city and part of its agglomeration (of
which the major part is located within the administrative borders of the city of Ghent),
but also includes the western extension of  the Antwerp metropolitan area into the
province of East-Flanders. Cluster 4 is comparable to cluster 2 in the case of Antwerp
and cluster 1 is similar to the Antwerp cluster 1. Cluster 2 and 5 show specific patterns
that have to do with the influence of Brussels and the early industrialized character of
the  area.  Nonetheless,  both  analyses  confirm  the  results  of  the  previous  one  on
municipal elections: all three show a more or less stable pattern throughout the years
where Vlaams Blok voters are strongly concentrated in the central city, while Agalev
voters are more spread out over central city, agglomeration and banlieue. In electoral
terms, Vlaams Blok is clearly the most «urban» party,  while Agalev is  «urban» and
«suburban» at the same time. In the following analysis of both parties’ manifestoes, we
will assess how this works through in their ideology. 
 
Figure 2. Results of the cluster-analysis on the election results of Agalev and Vlaams Blok in the
province of Antwerp from 1977 to 1999.
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Figure 3. Cluster profiles for the province of Antwerp.
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Figure 4. Results of the cluster-analysis on the election results of Agalev and Vlaams Blok in the
province of East-Flanders from 1977 to 1999.
 
The party manifestoes of Vlaams Blok and Agalev
15 Classical manifesto analysis makes use of rather sophisticated quantitative methods of
media-analysis to construct left-right scales. For the sake of this explorative analysis,
we limited ourselves to a more qualitative approach. What is important for us is to give
an overview of the appearance of urban issues in both parties’ manifestoes in the two
decennia under scrutiny. What is striking is that none of the two parties actually drops
issues or standpoints in subsequent manifestoes once they have been taken. This might
mean that the issues mentioned do indeed form part of the parties «hometurf». In the
following overview, we will not mention every standpoint each year, but only point to
the year of appearance, or the year it underwent considerable changes. 
 
Vlaams Blok
16 From 1978 until the late 1980s, the Vlaams blok manifesto was more of a pamphlet of a
few sheets long. In their original manifestoes, the party did not yet pay much attention
to urban problems. The emphasis was on Flemish independence, European unification
(as  a  defence  against  Soviet  and Anglo-American imperialism)  and a  reform of  the
economy towards a corporatist model. «Guest labourers», as labour migrants were still
called in their publications, did not get much attention; their forced repatriation was
demanded for the sake of cultural homogeneity and to protect them from becoming
uprooted. 
17 However, 1985 is a turning point. The «guest labourers' problem» comes more to the
fore, and for the first time, the connection between immigrants and cities is made.
Under  the  heading  «Birmingham»,  a  paragraph  is  devoted  to  the  appearance  of
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ghettoes and the manifesto implicitly connects this to the racial riots in Handsworth,
Birmingham that were seen on television: 
«The presence of a great number of guest labourers in a limited number of confined
spaces (mostly in certain neighbourhoods in big cities) will create ever growing and
more terrifying problems. (...) The Vlaams Blok repudiates the ‘Brazilification’ of
Flanders. Lest the images of Birmingham take place in Flanders.» (translation by
authors)
18 In 1987, everyday «insecurity» makes its first explicit appearance in the Vlaams Blok
manifesto. 
«We are worried about increasing insecurity on the street, in the shop and often
even at home. Crime is increasing. In ever more neighbourhoods of our big and
medium-sized  cities  it  is  not  advisable  to  venture  oneself  out  in  the  dark.»
(translation by authors)
19 Yet  the  presence  of  immigrants  is  not  yet  explicitly  linked  to  it.  Still,  the  «guest
labourers' problem» is one of uprootedness and redundancy; there is no work for them
anymore. Like in their first manifestoes, the solution «work in your own region» is still
the essence of the Vlaams Blok repatriation policy. 
20 In 1991, the Vlaams Blok eventually does put the blame for insecurity (in cities) on
immigrants:
«Masses of Turks, Moroccans, etc. are stick together in our big cities. Second and
third  generation  youngsters  are  uprooted  and  form  an  enduring  focus  of
dissatisfaction and crime.» (translation by authors)
21 The Vlaams Blok likes to cheer up its analysis with police data: 
«A  recent  state  police  report  proves  that  crime-rates among  non-European
foreigners are four times higher than among the own population. 1 on 3 (33%) of
the imprisoned criminals are foreign...» (translation by authors)
22 With the explicit  link between foreigners-crime-insecurity  in  big  cities,  the Vlaams
Blok has found its hit story. The elections of 24 November 1991 are the first to be called
«Black Sunday». Vlaams Blok raises its votes from 3% to 10.3% in Flanders. Year after
year, the Vlaams Blok will repeat its story on what they call «the three V’s: Vlaanderen,
vreemdelingen, veiligheid». (Flanders, foreigners, security). In 1995, the Vlaams Blok
rises from 10.3 to 12.2, in 1999 from 12.2 to 15.3. Increasingly, the party stresses the
link between the last two V’s: foreigners and security. In 1999, the last manifesto we
analysed, the chapters on foreigners and insecurity (in which many explicit links to
foreigners appear) occupy 31 of the 140 pages manifesto. Moreover, the same issues
reappear  regularly  under  other  headings:  e.g.  under  the  heading  «poverty»  («the
Vlaams Blok thinks that many projects of the Social Impulse Fund (SIF)2, who took over
the budget of the Flemish Fund for the Integration of Deprived Persons (VFIK), have
often been misused to oversubsidize projects for foreigners») or under «Elderly policy»
(«a safe living environment for elderly»).
 
Agalev
23 Agalev’s first manifesto appears only in 1981. Like the first Vlaams Blok manifestoes, it
is not much more than a pamphlet and only contains one standpoint on urban policy or
urban issues.  In a reaction to the urban renewal of the 1970s,  limited to a physical
renewal of derelict housing blocs, Agalev stresses the need to increase the «liveability»
of neighbourhoods by better facilities and services. An important advantage of such a
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«social  renewal»  would  be  to  reduce  suburbanisation  and  the  (energy  wasting,
polluting) commuting that it brings along. 
24 Suburbanisation or «urban flight», as it is called in Agalev manifestoes, will stay central
to  any  urban  policy  measure  Agalev  further  proposes.  In  1985,  the  issue  of  urban
renewal is elaborated further. Again the inner city, depicted as an insalubrious and
unhealthy environment of «derelict  neighbourhoods in which only the poorest stay
behind», has to be made liveable again, by a policy of social urban renewal, renovation
and compact urbanisation. This is necessary to counter the building up of open spaces
and increasing pollution brought about by suburbanisation and commuting. 
25 New  «urban»  standpoints  are  also  added  to  the  manifesto:  Agalev  wants  a  re-
orientation of housing policy, now aiming too much on private building and owner-
occupation; which again has led to uncontrolled suburbanisation. 
26 Yet  Agalev  is  not  solely  preoccupied  by  the  protection  of  open  spaces  and  the
countryside against suburbanisation. In its 1985 manifesto, the party also expresses its
worries  about  poverty  that  is  explained  by  a  failing  housing  policy  and  the
«arbitrariness of the private rental market». 
«The Green strife for an equitable distribution of  the available living space and
living expenses, the preservation and renovation of existing houses (e.g. by urban
renewal).» (translation by authors) 
27 According  to  Agalev,  social  housing  construction  has  to  be  intensified,  in  order  to
provide decent housing with minimum comfort to all. The private rental market has to
be controlled more strictly, to the advantage of the tenant. Social displacement has to
be countered and renovation has to be made possible for the lower income groups by
means of rent subsidies. 
28 In 1985, Agalev also has an eye for immigrants:  the concentration of immigrants in
isolated,  deprived  neighbourhoods  preserves  existing  prejudices  about  them;  it  is
therefore necessary to pay attention to decent housing for foreigners. 
29 The manifesto of 1987 is an almost perfect copy of the 1985 one, although this is the
first year Agalev says something about asylum seekers: they should be spread over the
country, to raise country-wide consciousness of the problems in the third world. 
30 In 1991, the content of the manifesto does not change much either. Agalev now works
with a general manifesto and thematic pamphlets, of which the general manifesto is a
summary. In the manifesto, little is said about housing, and urban renewal is again
reduced to an action against «urban flight». Agalev does however pay some attention to
«the poorest families» and «the original inhabitants», by claiming an adaptation of the
housing law. The pamphlet on social policy puts more emphasis on housing; Agalev
demands  attention  for  the  housing  problems  of  the  poorest.  They  emphasize  the
problems  of  access  to  social  housing,  but  also  stress  that  the  integration  of  social
housing projects in the urban tissue and the provision of a diversity of houses should
prevent them from becoming ghettoes.
31 In 1995, Agalev pays more attention to the city again. Apart from the reappearing older
claims, they now demand a «Fund for Urban Renewal» to counter the worst housing
problems  and  decay,  a  long-range  plan  for  social  housing  and  small-scale  renewal
actions in the living environment, and an active land acquirement policy. 
32 What  is  more significant  however  is  that  the  1995  manifesto  also  witnesses  the
appearance of an urban theme that so far had been totally absent of Agalev’s ideology.
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After the Vlaams Blok’s spectacular success in 1991, Agalev equally seems to feel the
need to address the issue of insecurity. Agalev’s explanation and solution of insecurity
however stand in sharp contrast to what Vlaams Blok has to say about this; for the
Green, feelings of insecurity are a consequence of individualisation and poverty, rather
than of an increase in crime. Therefore crime has to be addressed with soft prevention
rather  than  repression.  Repression  should  be  preserved  for  capital  offences,
environmental  crimes and assaults  on public  health,  fiscal  fraude,  corruption,  drug
maffia, trading humans, rather than for petty crime. 
33 In 1999 insecurity is elaborated further, similarly stressing capital, environmental and
white-collar  crime,  but  with increasing attention to  «violent  crimes in  general  and
every act that stimulates feelings of insecurity». Repression is no longer a taboo, and
Agalev offers some concrete suggestions, while at the same time demanding attention
for what they call  «social  safety».  Physical  interventions in the urban environment
have to be «socially safe», trams should again have their good old conductors, who
might even have limited police authority. The SIF is called a valuable instrument for
welfare and redistribution. However, an increased liveability of the city remains in the
first place a means to counter suburbanisation and Agalev demands a «Fund for Urban
Renewal» next to the SIF.
 
Conclusion
34 Both  Agalev  and  Vlaams  Blok  are  alleged  to  be  distinctively  «urban»  parties.
Nonetheless, a detailed analysis of the history of their electoral geography in their first
two  decennia  of  existence  shows  clearly  different  patterns.  Vlaams  Blok  is  indeed
strongly  embedded  in  the  inner  city.  Even  while  since  1995  the  party  increasingly
draws support from the agglomeration, the gap with the inner city is far from being
filled. Agalev on the contrary, is strong in the inner city, as well as in the agglomeration
and banlieue, and this since its most early days. 
35 This subtle difference is clearly reflected in both parties’  ideologies as translated in
their manifestoes.  Both parties pay considerable attention to issues related to their
electoral strongholds. Throughout the years, Vlaams Blok has focused increasingly on
explicitly urban issues and clearly owes a great deal of its succes to it. Agalev on the
other hand always had to satisfy a suburban, as well as an urban electorate, and has
throughout  the  whole  period  tried  to  balance  the  demands  of  both.  In  line  with
classical manifesto research, we can here suppose a dialectical relationship between
electoral competition and manifesto content; what is new is that this relationship also
seems  to  have  a  spatial  element.  The  spatial  references  in  the  manifesto  stayed
remarkably  the  same  throughout  the  more  than  20  years  under  scrutiny,  giving
support to the thesis of Budge on the relative ideological immobility of parties. 
36 In  line  with Robertson’s  saliency theory,  Agalev,  nor  Vlaams Blok try  to  cover  the
whole range of urban issues, but have carved out neatly separated niches. Agalev does
not pay much attention to insecurity, and when the issue of immigrants is taken up,
this is a reaction to «racism and prejudices». Vlaams Blok is not interested in town and
country planning or  urban renewal,  let  alone suburbanisation.  Only once,  after  the
Vlaams Blok’s spectacular success in 1991, where insecurity seemed to have been the
«talk of the town», Agalev felt the urge to consider this typical Vlaams Blok issue. They
nonetheless tried to approach it from a completely different, more «leftist» angle- only
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to shift more to the centre after another electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in 1995 on
the base of the same topic. 
37 In the light of these results, it is doubtful that Agalev would be capable to become a
«leftist» challenger to the urban success of the Vlaams Blok. Contrary to the latter,
Agalev is forced to satisfy two different socio-spatial milieus, and will not be able to
choose for the city at full length. In their manifesto, urban measures such as urban
renewal simultaneously serve suburban goals, such as the preservation of open space
or the limitation of  commuter traffic.  When forced to  choose,  urban and suburban
demands are in fierce competition, as has been demonstrated when Agalev dropped the
demand of suffrage for immigrants when coming to power in 1999, in favour of more
suburban demands (see Kesteloot, 1999). The Vlaams Blok does focus rather exclusively
on urban issues, but departs from a particularly dystopian view of the city and indeed
proposes  an  inherently  anti-urban  strategy  of  repression  and  rejection  of  urban
diversity. 
38 The theoretical value of this analysis lies in the fact that it has shown the importance of
a spatial analysis of party strategies of support. Putting forward spatially related issues
in  their  ideology,  parties  do  indeed  draw  support  from  geographically  specific
electorates.  Consciously or subconsciously,  parties seem to take electoral geography
into account in their  strategies of  support,  such as manifesto writing.  The classical
manifesto analyses so far have given prominence to the analysis of cleavages within an
essentially  national  electorate.  This  analysis  however  shows  how  party  ideologies
equally reflect spatial differentiations or cleavages within the national electorate. For a
full understanding of politics of support, political scientists cannot ignore these spatial
strategies. 
39 Political  geographers  have  so  far  ignored  the  importance  of  manifesto  research.
Nonetheless, the electoral geography of parties can be better explained if we take into
account  the  spatial  elements  of  their  ideology.  As  Savage  (1987)  puts  it,  voting
behaviour is mediated by materially significant aspects of place. At least some parties
seem to make use of these spatially differentiating elements to carve out an electoral
niche that provides them with a more or less stable base of support.(A geographical
interpretation of) manifesto research allows us for instance to endeavour making some
predictions after the very interesting Belgian parliamentary elections of May 2003. In
previous elections, Agalev nor Vlaams Blok were inclined to change their manifesto
drastically, because both showed a rather stable growth path. However in 2003, Agalev
experienced a drastic loss of votes. This might force the party to relatively important
ideological innovation; indeed, the party claims to have started this process.  At the
same time, the Vlaams Blok seems to have finally broken through in more peripheral
zones of the metropolitan area and might feel obliged to pay more attention to non-
urban issues. The transformation of the socialist party from a decidedly urban into a
more peripheral party - simultaneous with and under the pressure of the urban advent
of both Agalev and Vlaams Blok -  might prove an interesting case to look at as an
example for these future developments.
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NOTES
1. We considered each zone of  the  metropolitan area  (central  city,  agglomeration,  banlieue,
commuter zone, rest) to be a sociological unity. Therefore we did not count the average of the
percentages per party of each commune in a certain zone, but took the percentage per party of
all the votes in a certain zone.
2. The Flemish «Social Impulse Fund» or SIF was the main instrument of the first explicit urban
policy in Belgium. One of the explicit aims of the Flemish government when appointing socialist
Leo Peeters «minister of urban policy» was to counter the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok by
enhancing the liveability of the urban environment and the fight against (urban) poverty.
ABSTRACTS
This paper examines the relationship between electoral results and party manifestoes from a
spatial  perspective.  The  manifestoes  and  electoral  geography  of  two  new,  allegedly  «urban»
parties in Flanders are compared in order to assess whether these parties might, in their ideas
and consequential policies, contribute to a reinforcement of the urban milieu in Flanders. We end
up with a rather pessimistic  conclusion:  the Vlaams Blok,  adhering an inherently anti-urban
ideology, nor Agalev, who have to satisfy a suburban as well as an urban electorate, seem to be
able to defend the urban milieu in Flanders. 
In  dit  artikel  wordt  de  relatie  tussen electorale  resultaten en  partijprogramma’s  onderzocht
vanuit  een  ruimtelijk  perspectief.  De  partijprogramma’s  en  de  electorale  geografie  van twee
schijnbaar «stedelijke» partijen in Vlaanderen worden vergeleken om na te gaan of deze partijen,
in hun ideeën en daaruit volgend beleid, bijdragen aan een versterking van het stedelijke milieu
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in Vlaanderen. We besluiten met een eerder pessimistische conclusie: noch het Vlaams Blok, dat
een inherent anti-stedelijke ideologie aanhangt, noch Agalev, die rekening moet houden met een
stedelijk zowel als een suburbaan electoraat, lijken in staat te zijn de belangen van het stedelijke
milieu te verdedigen.
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